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Foreword
Two projects in KwaZulu-Natal have grappled withdifferent components of tenure security in commonproperty systems. The Legal Entity AssessmentProject (LEAP), managed by Tessa Cousins, has been
exploring the situation of common property institutions set up
under land reform programmes with the aim of improving
practices and procedures in their establishment and support.
Simultaneously, the Pilot in Land Administration and Records
project (PILAR) aims to develop local systems and institutions for
recording individual land holdings within common property
systems in order to strengthen tenure security for members.
The Association for Rural Advancement initiated this project,
which Donna Hornby works on. Linkages between these
projects arise from the synergy in their objectives and have led
to a joint search for conceptual clarity in what is proving to be
the complex and messy world of tenure and common property
institutions. This paper is a product of this work, and was
prepared for the CASS/PLAAS CBNRM Programme 2nd Annual
Regional Meeting Legal aspects of governance of CBNRM, 16
17 October 2000.
iii
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1. Introduction
New common property institutions (CPIs) were createdin South Africa soon after 1994 to enable self-constituted groups of people a choice about how theywished to acquire, hold and manage land. They were to
provide rural people with an alternative to individual freehold,
tribal administration and other legal group ownership options.
This form of CPI, created through the Communal Property
Associations (CPA) Act 28 of 1996 (the Act), focused on local
constitution making as the mechanism for constituting the
group and for realising individual and collective self-
determination. However, concerns about the viability of these
new institutions were voiced within a month of the publication
of the Act (Hornby 1996) and in time became an active discourse
that declared them to be failing (LEAP 1999).
This paper takes a hard look at the claim that these new
common property institutions are failing and argues that there
are no meaningful indicators against which assessments of
success or failure can be made. It asserts that the tenure
security of the group and its members should be the primary
purpose of land reform CPIs, because secure tenure is the
primary mechanism for reducing risk for vulnerable people and
is the universal need of the group. Securing tenure of individual
members of CPIs, rests upon the clarity and accessibility of
procedures for the assertion and justification of property rights
and institutional mechanisms for realising and enforcing these
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 2
Leaping the fissures
Tessa Cousins and Donna Hornby
rights. Useful indicators of security then become the degree to
which these procedures and mechanisms are known, accessible,
equitable, clear, used, socially accepted, transparent and
enforced. This in turn requires that CPIs are developed from
adaptations of current local practices within a broader
environment in which there is legal, institutional and technical
coherence and support for this approach. Without an enabling
legal, institutional and technical framework, the tenure security
of members of CPIs will not be significantly improved. It is
political choices that inform whether or not this will take place.
The paper begins by analysing what the new CPIs were set up
to do and the legal and political framework in which they were
created. It goes on to reflect on lessons that the Legal Entity
Assessment Project (LEAP) has drawn from assessing the
situation of land reform CPIs. Using the focus of tenure security
and drawing on lessons from tenure work in Africa, the paper
then interrogates in depth how membership has been
constituted in land reform CPIs and whether the institutional
context in which they have been set up has provided adequate
support. It concludes by asserting that community constitutions
reflect ambiguous and contradictory definitions of membership
without reference to local practices and institutions. The state
has not supported CPIs institutionally, or acknowledged the
importance of institutional linkages at local level or provided
legal, institutional and technical coherence. This creates an
indeterminacy that puts tenure for members at risk. The
analysis leads to some practical suggestions for field and
bureaucratic practices. It proposes that prescriptive
requirements are replaced by an approach that enables groups
to articulate current procedures and institutions, and uses the
suggested indicators to achieve gradual adaptation towards
greater equity. A framework such as that offered by the Land
Rights Bill is needed to provide support for such an approach
and thus broader legal and policy reform is necessary.
2. Legislating social order
2.1 What the CPA Act intended
The CPA Act was one of the early pieces of legislation developed
as part of tenure reform in South Africa after 1994. The Act
sought to enable communities to form juristic persons to be
known as communal property associations, in order to acquire,
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hold and manage property on a basis agreed to by members of a
community in terms of a written constitution (DLA 1996:1).
Policy makers recognised that communal systems fulfil social
and economic functions and should be a choice for people as a
tenure form. An assumption behind the drafting was that
available legal forms (voluntary associations, share-block
schemes, sectional titles and trusts) were generally not
appropriate due to complex administrative requirements.
Furthermore, they noted that trusts (widely used as vehicles for
this kind of land holding) place the property in the hands of
some on behalf of others, rather than directly in the hands of
people themselves. (DLA 1997:63)
The legal basis for the establishment of a CPI in terms of the
Act is an agreement between the members of the community,
which is written into a constitution. However, the Act also
prescribes principles to be included in every constitution, which
are the values enshrined in the national constitution. These
principles are:
· fair and inclusive decision-making processes
· equality of membership
· democratic processes
· fair access to the associations property
· accountability and transparency.
In addition to this requirement, the schedule of the Act specifies
the matters that must be included in the constitution for it to be




· Qualification criteria for membership and a list of names
and ID numbers.
· Where this is not possible for intended members, principles
must be stated for identifying those entitled to membership.
· Classes of membership (if any), and whether membership is
individual or family based.
Rights:
· Rights of members to use of property.
· Differences in rights (if any) for different classes of member.
· Rights of members to sell, and if so to whom.
· What happens to rights on the death of a member?
· What happens to rights and property of members if
membership is terminated?
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 4
Leaping the fissures
Tessa Cousins and Donna Hornby
Procedures:
· Procedures for resolving disputes on rights to membership.
· If membership is family based how the unit is represented
in decision-making processes of the association.
· Grounds and procedures for terminating membership.
The property
The purposes for which it may be used, physical division and
allocation.
Decision-making
· Procedures governing the AGM and General Meetings must
be specified, as must be rules for changing the constitution
and dissolving the association. Disciplinary procedures and
dispute resolution mechanisms must also be specified.
· The committee  election, composition, powers, removal and
payment must all be specified. Records of meetings and
financial transactions must be kept and made accessible to
all members.
There is a tension between the Acts intention of enabling the
creation of CPIs on the basis of agreements reached amongst
self-constituted members and the desire to institute democracy
and to protect vulnerable members from abuse. This leads to
tight prescriptions on what must be agreed to and the principles
that must prevail in reaching these agreements. These
requirements, combined with policy objectives (DLA 1997:v) that
land reform projects must be sustainable and improve peoples
lives, set the scene in which the resultant institutions become
overburdened with unrealistic objectives and expectations.
The question is: How did this density of expectation come
about?
2.2 The political context
The CPA Act was drafted by land NGOs, human rights lawyers
and academics in the wake of the national South African
Constitution becoming law in 1995. Thus, the Act was passed in
a legal and political environment dominated by the heady
successes of constitutionalism as a means of creating the
citizenship of a new South African democracy based on
universal values. It was a time marked by a belief that
community and citizenship could be reinvented through
constitution-making. Klug (2000:13) argues that there was a
consensus that individual and collective self-determination
would be realised by adopting the universal values of the new
Constitution. Thus, the CPA Act reflected a process of self-
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constitution for rural landholders that was modelled on the
successful negotiation of a national Constitution. He goes on to
suggest that this paradigm was proposed as the means to
resolve locally, through CPAs, a range of tensions unresolved in
the national Constitution. These include how groups could hold
land communally while solving problems of discrimination
against women and the role of chiefs. (Klug 2000:115)
The paradigm in which the Act was enacted was driven by a
key assumption and a critical political choice that were to have
major consequences for the processes of constructing CPIs and
for their effective functioning.
The assumption expressed in the Act is that the purpose of
law is to define how things should be, with the aim of
transforming reality accordingly (Levigny Delville 2000:107).
This positivist understanding sees the law as an instrument that
can prescribe and thus legislate a particular social order into
being. The Act intended to create a social order in land reform
projects that was defined by self-determination within the
universal principles of democracy and equity.
Underlying this assumption is a firm faith that law can
regulate society and regulate it absolutely. There is little
recognition here of either the common experience that society
can only ever be partially regulated, or of the multiple sources
and spheres of regulatory activity that exist in any society.
According to Moore (1978:3), social reality is a mix of actions,
which are congruent with rules (although they may arise from
conflicting or competing rule-orders), as well as actions that are
choice-making, discretionary, manipulative, sometimes
inconsistent, and sometimes conflictual. In other words, the
law, as a product of legislative activity, is one source of social
regulation and its intent will be mediated by the impact of other
sources of rule-making and discretionary activity on how the law
is used, interpreted and manipulated within any particular
human grouping.
Legal positivism is ill-equipped to embrace this social
complexity precisely because it aspires to social transformation
and not merely social regulation. The CPA Act is no exception.
However, the failure of legislators to accommodate the complex
social reality that the Act intended to transform continues to
play itself out in the establishment and functioning of CPIs
through officials at many levels, service providers contracted by
officials and communities engaging with land reform.
In addition to the positivist assumptions expressed in the Act,
the legislators also made an important political choice in
excluding any role for traditional authorities and customary
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practices in the new CPIs. This choice was not in itself
surprising and is referred to specifically in various places in the
White Paper (DLA 1997:32). Policy makers were concerned
about tribal authorities that do not function democratically, are
abusive and operate in ways that undermine constitutionally
entrenched human rights. The law, therefore, intended to
provide a means for land owning groups to choose a structure to
represent them in making decisions on land access and
management issues (DLA 1997:63).
What was surprising, however, was the seeming assumption
that the new CPIs could exist in parallel with traditional systems
without intrusion, confusion or conflict. The transformed social
order that was to be realised through CPAs is directly at odds
with the modes of governance derived from lineage and custom
that frame most rural peoples lives, particularly in KwaZulu-
Natal. The White Paper also reflects this unresolved, ambivalent
political choice, which accommodates both chiefs and democracy
in theory but does not give guidance about how to do this in
practice.1 This has consequences that are discussed in detail
below.
Land reform policy was drafted in a political environment in
which multiple voices and interests were listened to, as the
White Paper attempted to take account of conflicting demands of
various stakeholders. One of these was for sustainable land
use. The commercial farming sector and unspecified provincial
government departments specifically noted concerns regarding
communal ownership and the problem of free-riders (DLA
1997:vii).  Sustainability, a concept for protection of the
environment and people, when left undefined can become a
threat, wielded to blame and exclude the poor.
As policy and law tried to reflect the many concerns of the
varied interests in the country, while holding firm to the
principles of equity and democracy, so the new CPIs became the
terrain on which multiple, conflicting interests and needs would
have to be balanced and realised.
3. Reality on the ground
In response to widespread concerns about the long-term viability of CPIs being created through land reform, the Legal Entity Assessment Project (LEAP) assessed a number of CPIs in KwaZulu-Natal in order to inform strategies for
appropriate intervention (LEAP 1999).
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3.1 Problems encountered
These case-studies provided the basis for a number of
interactions with communities, DLA officials, service providers,
lawyers and academics, from which the following major
problems were identified:
· Unrealistic expectations of associations. CPIs are expected to
perform many functions at an early stage, meet utopian
value-based objectives of equity, democracy and non-
discrimination and exhibit viability and sustainability.
There are no given criteria for measuring levels of outcome.
· Processes for setting up associations in land reform projects
reflect a lack of understanding of tenure and of institutions.
There is no conceptual model for institution building in the
project cycle, and officials or service providers demonstrate
little understanding of tenure issues in common property
systems. It is not practice to build on existing practices or
institutions or in reference to them. There is little clarity or
subtlety in designing an appropriate legal vehicle or mix of
vehicles for the situation. Instead, the establishment of legal
entities has become a milestone on the project cycle time-
line that is completed as fast and cheaply as possible, with
successful registration rather than well-discussed
agreements as the driving force.
· The CPIs tend to be set up as if in an institutional vacuum.
The associations are not linked into other institutions of
land administration, such as local government or tribal
authorities unless they do this themselves. Furthermore,
there is no monitoring of trusts nor is there any support to
CPAs. Although the Act provides for DLA to monitor and
support CPAs, DLA has not allocated resources to fulfil these
obligations.
· In the founding documents, membership is frequently defined
in contradictory ways. This sets the stage for a lack of clarity
about the basis on which people can make claims to land
rights or use. Where the documents are not contradictory,
they do not provide protection for the bulk of community
members as they give rights of alienation of land to
household heads.
· There are numerous problems with founding documents. They
are inaccessible to a largely unilingual membership in that
most are written in English and incomprehensible legalese
and are often physically unavailable on site. They say little
or nothing about key issues of land rights management
procedures and linkages to external land administration
institutions. They are not logically set out in a meaningful
manner, while including great detail on issues that should
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be elsewhere or which do not apply. Sometimes, they
contain clauses that the community does not know about,
because lawyers or officials made additions or changes in
order to meet registration requirements, or because they
thought they were necessary. These all cause problems in
themselves, but LEAP suggests that perhaps even more
importantly they reflect attitudes and practices of officials
and service providers. The officially constructed documents
indicate a clear weighting on the side of imposition and
barely acknowledge, let alone attempt to balance, the
tensions inherent in the Act between prescription and self-
constitution.
3.2 The need for indicators
As an early task, LEAP needed to discover the most meaningful
indicators for assessment, and was confronted head-on by the
multiple purposes and idealistic expectations imposed on CPIs.
Goals are a starting place for indicators, and LEAP (2000:11)
identified the generally understood purposes of the CPIs to be to:
· enable transfer of land for the group, thereby securing the
groups tenure
· provide security of tenure for the members of the group
· provide democratic, accountable, equitable governance
· manage natural resources sustainably
· manage development
· ensure gender equity.
A number of the above do not have indicators, e.g. the goals of
gender equity (Hargreaves & Meer 1999), tenure security and
sustainable resource management. Those aspects that do have
indicators, such as democracy and accountability appear to
relate to what is in the document in relation to the Act and not
to practices on the ground. LEAP, therefore, decided that a
sweeping judgement on these institutions as working or not
working is not possible until agreed, clear and appropriate
criteria for evaluation have been established.
Certainly, the institutions practices are to varying degrees far
removed from their constitutions, but that is not a suitable
measure of their effectiveness, as the documents are (again to
varying degrees) flawed. There do seem to be a number of both
varying and common problems and weaknesses in the CPIs, but
the causes of these problems lie at a number of levels, and LEAP
has, thus, come to reflect on the larger legal and institutional
picture surrounding the CPIs under consideration.
The search for meaningful indicators led LEAP to suggest that
tenure security should be the primary purpose of land reform
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 9
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CPIs. The purposes of equity, democracy and accountability
should operate to secure tenure rights, rather than be models of
an ideal society. Moreover, tenure security, and institutions for
this purpose, are the foundations for building natural resource
and development management. LEAP now asserts that the key
indicators should be:
· the processes through which community members assert
their interests and rights to land
· the basis on which these are justified
· the institutional processes and mechanisms by which rights
are implemented.
What needs to be measured then is the degree to which these
processes are known, equitable, clear, accessible, used, socially
accepted, transparent and enforced.
This has led LEAP to suggest that the focus for attention must
be the definition of membership and on how institutional
processes and linkages work. Membership creates a basis for an
assertion of rights. Institutional processes decide and arbitrate
on the validity of the assertion, on the nature of the right and
on the means of enforcement.
4. Lessons from African tenure reform
Acurrent wisdom is emerging from attempts to reform tenure throughout Africa. Historically, colonial land law  either disregarded customary land management   systems or adapted them to benefit rulers. This legacy
of legal dualism continues as a current reality that cannot be
ignored. Liberation governments also largely dismissed
customary rights and systems in favour of land laws geared
towards economic objectives, such as nationalisation (that
centralised allocation rights in the state) or individual titling
(that was intended to facilitate land markets to encourage
investment). These stated objectives were rarely achieved and
the interventions, combined with the colonial legacy, often
resulted in confusion about who had rights and what the
legitimate processes were for asserting, justifying and realising
rights (Toulmin & Quan 2000).
A number of lessons were learned from these attempts at
reforming tenure, but key for our purposes are the following:
· Customary land management systems do provide secure
tenure, and sufficiently so to facilitate investment.
· Customary rights and land management systems survive
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 10
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legislated attempts to transform or eliminate them, and
indeed often re-emerge as dominant forms in reformed
areas.
· Customary land management systems adapt to the local
impact of legal, political, economic and social changes and
are, therefore, flexible and evolutionary.
· Failure to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of
multiple land management systems results in overlapping,
competing and conflicting rights and adjudicatory
mechanisms. These are frequently manipulated and
exploited by powerful élites.
While tenure security remains a vexed issue in Africa, there is
an emerging consensus about the elements that need to be
built into any attempt to secure tenure and what the constraints
are likely to be. Using this as a framework, we can now attempt
to identify what one would need to look for in the legal and
administrative processes of establishing CPIs in order to assess
the extent to which these principles are incorporated. The three
key areas are:
Firstly, adapting to existing realities rather than attempting to
replace them involves giving legal recognition to existing rights
and building linkages between local landholding systems and
formal law (Bruce 1994). However, this poses significant
challenges and risks. Attempts to codify local rules in Niger
resulted in the simplification and fixing of an otherwise complex
and flexible body of rules. Instrumental approaches of recording
existing rights in Ivory Coast resulted in administrative
simplification of different levels of interlocking rights, thus
resulting in the marginalisation of secondary rights. (Lavigne
Delville 2000:107108)
Secondly, bridging or harmonising local (customary) and
statutory law is enormously complex. Models of private
ownership and registration inform statutory tenure law while
customary law is by nature procedural. (Chauveau in Levigny
Delville 2000:98) Statutory law thus defines each persons rights
specifically and substantively, while rights allocated through
customary law are the result of negotiations based on known
procedures in which local authorities are arbiters.
Thirdly, legal, institutional and technical coherence requires
that tenure laws are consistent with one another, that levels of
institutional support and control are clear and support the legal
objectives, and that the technical components fit the legal
objectives and can be implemented from both a state and public
perspective. Legal pluralism poses particular challenges to the
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 11
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possibility of this coherence because there are multiple
arbitration authorities. The absence of clear links between these
authorities leads to uncertainty about who may deliver rulings
and at which level, resulting in unpredictable outcomes and the
challenging of all forms of arbitration. (Levigny Delville
2000:119121)
The key constraints to securing tenure are likely to be the
costs of setting up cohesive frameworks based on in-depth local
knowledge and consultation, and making explicit political
choices where confusion benefits ruling and administrative
classes and their allies (Levigny Delville 2000; McAuslan 2000).
An area of fundamental political choice for many African states
is that of the relationship between the authority of the state and
the authority of traditional leaders. These systems of governance
are based on radically different principles of authority and are
both of a highly political nature, which makes harmonisation
difficult. Nevertheless, the situation is worsened when the
absence of political clarity manifests itself in complex,
interrelated legal texts that are often poorly understood, and
which create a fuzziness that ruling and administrative classes
can exploit.
5. Constituting membership
Clear definition of, or criteria for, membership is  commonly proposed as fundamentally important  for securing the tenure rights, and for managing  land. Membership accords rights and is, therefore, the
basis upon which rights can be asserted and justified. It is also
the basis upon which others can be excluded and is, therefore,
the basis for constituting community and group identity. In
recognition of this, the CPA Act requires membership definition,
and the regulations to the Act put it near first on the list. Terms
of References for legal entity establishment all ask for clarity of
entry and exit, i.e. how membership is gained and lost.
Yet there is legal incoherence in legislation and also in the
use/definition of member in many CPI founding documents.
Moreover, communities have adapted their own use of the term
in order to optimise access to grants and to meet bureaucratic
requirements. This section considers these issues and what this
means for the constituting of membership by looking at
founding documents and community experience in a number of
LEAP case-studies.
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5.1 The message on membership from constitutions
LEAP spent some time analysing the constitutions, first to
compare them with actual practice observed in the field, and
again more recently when undertaking to translate the
documents into the communities vernacular  and this meant
turning them first from legal into ordinary English. The
documents reveal some of the problems around membership,
and how practitioners and officials have thought about and
addressed these.
Terminology regarding membership is confusing in the
documentation. There are references to beneficiaries where
trusts were used, this being the accepted legal term, but
beneficiaries is also the term commonly used to refer to those
who receive land reform grants. The Act refers to members of the
Association, and in many of the documents references are made
to persons, members, member households, participating
members, rightful members and members of member
households; and these references are neither consistent nor
differentiated. Trust deeds sometimes refer to members and
sometimes to beneficiaries, because of the desire to create an
accountable membership rather than beneficiary relationship to
the trustees.
However, what we see in the documents is not simply chance
variation in terminology, nor just poor definition and sloppiness
on the part of the drafters (although there is plenty of evidence
of this). Rather there is some deliberate variation in how
membership is dealt with by the drafters, but there is reason to
doubt that this reflects the real differences between particular
communities.
One major problem drafters face is whether membership
should be defined as household or as individual. The concern is
how to secure individual rights when land rights are gained
through being part of a household, and what is the nature of
the rights, responsibilities and internal relationships of the
household. This is of particular concern when it comes to the
securing of womens tenure rights, as households are sites of
co-operative conflict in which women are structurally
disadvantaged (Sen in Cousins 1996:19). Changes to customary
arrangements of responsibility and obligation can have the
unintended consequence of increasing risk rather than adding
to tenure security for women (Cousins 1996:35).
 There is no constitution that LEAP has seen that manages to
reflect community concepts and practices regarding
membership of the community and the attendant rights and
responsibilities. The drafters generally seek to design a set of
clauses that define community practices according to the legal
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 13
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and policy principles of equity. Drafters are biased towards a
formal legal paradigm as regards land, ownership and decision-
making. Thus, the constitutions usually seek to combine
ensuring security for all, equity and democracy AND rights to
transfer and to alienate rights AND processes to expel and
exclude members AND to define voting rights and quorums in
standard received formats. These are fissures that cannot be
bridged by current law and practice.
5.2 A closer look at case studies
One standard constitution: Nkaseni
To turn to some examples of how this plays itself out, we draw
on examples of constitutions and compare these to community
practices as LEAP observed them. In the constitutions of
Intuthuko, Vukile/Impala and Nkaseni2 the same pattern of
unclear, inconsistent and, therefore, contradictory definition of
membership can be seen.
To illustrate this here are extracts from Nkasenis
constitution:
Preamble:  establish  Trust  to hold (land) for and on
behalf of the participating member families from the
community, and generally facilitate the land use of said
land by the participating members. In definitions:
participating members shall mean the rightful
participants  (which are designated in clause 10.1 as) 
Families eligible to apply for benefit  of the Trust 
shall comprise of the families  whose applications for a
settlement grant have been approved by the Department of
Land Affairs. Membership shall be vested in these families
and the said families shall be registered in a membership
register as participating members.
The above seems to say clearly that beneficiaries of the trust are
families. Yet in later clauses a member is referred to as an
individual:
(10.3)  new membership shall only be considered if and
when a participating member decides to leave the land and
wishes to sell his or her rights in the land 
(10.4) Membership of the Trust shall be terminated upon 
the death of the member, at which point the legal successor
of the deceased will become a member.
(10.4.3)  membership may be terminated  participating
member has engaged in conduct which would constitute an
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offence in terms of the Act. It goes on to say (in
clause10.4.4) that if  a participating member is expelled 
the Trustees shall award his or her spouse or  dependants
so as to replace  (him or her)  on the membership
register.
Clause 11.6 refers to  The right to bequeath to his or her
heirs  and  In the event that a member dies, the surviving
spouse will automatically inherit membership.
The clause on voting reflects the participating member as 
representing his or her family.
We see then that in this example families or households are
given as the unit of membership but on issues of termination or
transfer, membership refers to household heads.
Nkaseni
Let us now look at what the fieldwork in two of the communities
reveals about membership in practice. In Nkaseni there are 39
beneficiaries, and 25 households. These are labour tenants, who
did not move from their existing homes and have a strong, clear
identity as a community. There are six families who live outside
the boundary of the piece of land demarcated for sale to the
group who decided not to move, because they would have to
rebuild. They are considered part of Nkaseni, are part of
meetings and decision-making, and the community map
included them.
Vukile
In Vukile the picture is different. The previous landowner
evicted most of those who lived there, and after 1994 the
evictees gathered to seek to reclaim this land. This they did
under a redistribution project. The farm valuation meant that
they had to find more people to secure sufficient grant money,
so they went looking for those who had been previously evicted,
and found enough to contribute their names to enable the
purchase. So the constitution talks of 110 households, when
there are only16 living on this land. This farm adjoins a tribal
area, and is effectively governed by the tribal authority. It is also
used for extra grazing for the adjoining tribal area, though
recent reports suggest that residents are beginning to raise
objections to this.3 The community identity and their strategy
for future membership is not clear.
The use of households as units of membership is valid in
terms of community practice. It is the definition of members as
those who are grant beneficiaries that moves the documents
away from reality in the first instance, and goes on to create
further distortions.
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Uzulu Angafana Ukusuka
To draw on another example, the Uzulu Angafana Ukusuka CPA
is a labour tenant group, where there are seven beneficiaries
and four households. Persons are members, yet individual
membership is later stated to be vested in households, which
would result in four members. In the annexed list of members,
seven names are found. In either event the standard
constitution clauses are nonsensical regarding election of a
committee and separate meetings and quorums.
The other three constitutions LEAP analysed do not have the
same inconsistencies about membership definition. The first two
achieve clarity by making no attempt to protect the tenure of
household members.
Emsi
In the Emsi constitution the household head is the member,
and members are those household heads whose grants are
approved by the DLA. All rights of land and its use, rights of
voting and decision-making fall to this member. Clause 10.8
states that dependants of a member  may reside with him or
her. The notes made at the time of drafting indicate that the
drafters did discuss the reality of households as complex
institutions containing rights for all its members. Nevertheless,
this constitution allows the member to bequeath his or her
rights away from those household members living on the
property. In Emsi there are 52 households, of which eight are not
on any beneficiary list, and which no one is able (or prepared?)
to explain. There are two groups, those who were evicted,
scattered and have returned, and those who stayed. They live on
different sides of the river, and have differing experiences and
attitudes. People are not working in terms of their constitution
at all, and governance comes from the local tribal authority.
Gannahoek
The Gannahoek trust deed is different again. This was developed
prior to official land reform, and, interestingly, was used as a
case-study by those who drew up the CPA Act. Here member is
not used as a concept, beneficiaries are founder kraals, which
are listed, and which participated in the original purchase of the
farm, and (for future) any additional established kraal
recognised at Gannahoek in terms of the Agreement. Kraal is
defined as a family unit, comprising of residents, as
traditionally accepted amongst the residents of the farm and
shall include those persons dependant upon the head or heads
of the family according to civil and indigenous law. However, in
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recognition that this definition gives rights of voting and
decision-making to household heads alone, the drafters of the
document attempt to broaden management rights by requiring
the trustees to establish a separate body of two representatives
from each kraal, for decision-making and management.
In Gannahoek there is clarity amongst the residents about
who belongs, although there exists some disagreement about
who qualifies as new entrants. People struggled together to fight
eviction, collected money and purchased the farm, only
receiving land reform assistance at a later stage. They, therefore,
did not engage with DLA criteria for grants or registration, or
have to incorporate these considerations into their document.
Those who are members all paid in to purchase the farm. There
is no sense that this was paid by the household heads as
separate from their kraals. The residents committee described
in the constitution, intended to ensure broader representation,
simply never happened; it seems more because it did not make
sense to people than that they resisted the idea.
5.3 Understanding the difficulties of membership: listening for harmony
The three key elements for ensuring tenure security identified
earlier are:
· community practices should be adapted rather than
replaced
· customary and statutory law should be bridged and if
possible harmonised
· effective implementation requires legal, institutional and
technical cohesion.
Considering the above experiences in terms of these areas
suggests the following.
Apart from the problems at the formal legal level, the
constitutions are not in any way congruent with the daily reality
of peoples lives. In order to go the route of adaptation and
harmonisation we would first need to know what current
practices and customary law are regarding membership. At
present there is insufficient understanding of current practice,
nor are land reform processes allowing this to be explored. From
the LEAP fieldwork we get a partial picture, which mostly
reflects that it is not what the documents set out. The picture of
peoples realities is more diverse than that revealed by the
documents; this is not surprising as they reflect a particular,
dominant cultural and professional paradigm. The LEAP case-
study communities vary in the degree to which they express
clarity and cohesion about their membership. However, none of
the groups works with membership as set out in their
constitution; none of them refers to their document and the
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documents do not come close to actual practices. The degree of
variation between documents and practices is different between
communities.
Reflection on legal and technical cohesion highlights where
some of the problems in membership definition lie. The CPA Act
enables members of groups to hold and own land. There are,
however, a number of other laws and policies that define tenure
rights and entitlements. There is also law and policy that
determines what government can authorise expenditure for.
There are two key issues:
· Firstly, land rights legislation creates overlapping land rights
and entitlements. For example, a person living on state land
can, under some conditions, be both an occupier (ESTA
1997) and a beneficial occupier (IPIRLA 1997), while a
person living in a labour tenant family can be both an
associate and an occupier.
· Secondly, and more importantly in practice, there is little
consistency between the rights granted by the three laws
and the Act 126 (1993) policy criteria for determining who
can apply for a grant.
A consequence of this inconsistency is that the implementing
officials, who must account for public expenditure in terms of
law and policy, draw up lists of grant beneficiaries according to
the poverty criteria of the policy and not according to the land
rights and entitlements people have. It is then a very small step
for officials to use these same lists for determining the
membership of the group that will own and hold the land,
especially given that the grants are intended for land acquisition
(amongst other things).
Thus, while the Act leaves the substantive definition of
membership open for local definition, the ambiguity in policy
and legislation allows the official (or lawyer) to interpret the
beneficiary list as defining group membership. This is legally
contestable in terms of land rights legislation and may have
little to do with peoples own identification of membership of
their community.
6. Institutional problems and perspectives
The present institutional context in which CPIs are established is plagued by a number of problems. Firstly, the DLA does not provide support to CPIs once they have taken transfer of land. This is because it has no
legal authority to do so in the case of trusts, and inadequate
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human resources to undertake its legal obligations in terms of
the CPA Act. Secondly, the DLA has not created the
institutional support for managing CPI records and/or
registration of individual household land holdings and rights,
and thus has no basis for intervention in rights disputes.
Thirdly, the Act did not provide for traditional authorities and
there is no guidance on how [they] could be accommodated
within the CPA (ANCRA 1999). Fourthly, many communities
have disregarded their constitutions and have adapted or
created local institutional support for themselves. As a result of
this, there is concern that multiple allocatory and adjudicatory
procedures will create overlapping de facto rights that elude
both official and legal resolution, creating fundamental
insecurity of tenure.
This section will first consider some of these issues from the
perspective of communities who have either taken transfer of
land or are in the process of doing so. These examples are all
drawn from KwaZulu-Natal where the issue of tribal jurisdiction
and land control may be more present and politicised than in
other provinces. We will then look at elements of institutional
incoherence at government level.
6.1 The need for hybrid institutions: through the eyes of communities
Ekuthuleni
Ekuthuleni is a settled community in the process of taking
transfer of state owned land that people have lived on for a long
time. The area is an isigodi4 of the Enseleni Tribal Authority and
is currently managed by an induna who has authority over land
allocation and dispute resolution. An elected land committee,
which the induna chairs, is at the forefront of the initiative to
take transfer of the land. A constitution in terms of the Act has
been drawn up, but is not yet registered and the committee has
not been officially elected.5 The constitution makes a passing
reference to the continuing role of the Tribal Authority and yet
it does not unpack this role. Furthermore, it transfers all the
functions of the tribal authority to the CPA. The constitution
also makes provision for members to sell their land parcels.
At a recent workshop delegates role-played institutional
issues and procedures. What follows is one of the role-plays.
Dlamini went to see his cousin, Ntombela, to ask him for
some land. Ntombela agreed and pointed to the piece of land
along the river that ended as the river turned at his
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neighbours house. Dlamini could have it up to the tree and
from there to the road.
Ntombela then took Dlamini to the induna to introduce
him and tell him hed agreed to subdivide his land. The
induna asked Dlamini if he had a letter from the Inkosi 6 of
the area he was leaving, and Dlamini said yes. The induna
told Dlamini to accompany him to the Inkosi of the areas
house, where Dlamini paid the tribal secretary R400 as a
khonza7 fee. The Inkosi read the letter Dlamini had, asked
him some questions and then agreed to accept him as a
member of the tribe.
Back at the isigodi, Ntombela asked his neighbours to
come to his house to constitute an ibandla8 at the indunas
request. The induna arrived and pointed out the boundaries
so that Dlamini, Ntombela and all the members of the
ibandla could see them. After the ibandla left, Ntombela gave
the induna a bottle of whiskey, paid him R40 for his help and
provided meat and drink for a small braai. The following day
he came and built his house.
One day, Dlamini came home and saw pegs in the ground
on his allocated portion. He was wondering what they were
for when Mrs Dladla arrived and said the CPA had allocated
her a portion of land and marked the boundaries of her
allocation with the pegs. When Dlamini tried to tell Mrs
Dladla that the induna had already allocated that land to
himself, Mrs Dladla replied that the CPA had the authority to
subdivide land, not the induna. Unsure what to do, Dlamini
asked Ntombelas advice, and Ntombela suggested they go
and report the situation to the induna, which they did. In the
meanwhile, Mrs Dladla, also concerned that her allocation
was at risk from Dlamini, went and reported the situation to
the committee.
Both the induna and the committee were most disconcerted
by the reports they received. The induna said the authority to
allocate land came from the Inkosi who was the born leader
of the area and nobody could take this authority away. The
committee told Mrs Dladla that since the land had been
transferred to the CPA, the elected committee had the authority
to allocate land in terms of the constitution that was registered
with the DLA.
The two institutions were finally forced to meet in order to
resolve the situation. The dispute was intense and
conflictual, resulting in an urgent call to the DLA to come
and mediate the situation as provided for in the CPA Act.
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The role-play expresses the confusion the community has about
how the new land management system will relate to the
practices people are familiar with, and the anxiety that dual
systems will result in overlapping rights and dual adjudicatory
processes. It also indicates the necessity for outside institutional
support to resolve issues of competing local institutions. Sadly,
this support is not likely to be forthcoming.
If in this community there is a fear about the future, in other
communities the reality of dual, un-integrated institutions is
already the source of struggle and, at times, outright conflict.
AmaHlubi
The AmaHlubi, for instance, recently took transfer of land they
were evicted from last century. All members of the community
pay allegiance to Inkosi Hadebe. The community currently lives
on two properties, one of which Inkosi Hadebe owns personally
and the other that falls under the Ingonyama Trust. The new
land links the two previously disparate properties together and
is owned by a trust. During the process of setting up the trust,
the community requested that the land be transferred to Inkosi
Hadebe. However, the DLA did not have policies in place to
enable this and, at first, the NGO assisting them also resisted
the idea that an Inkosi should own land as his personal
property. The community thus strategically decided to conform
to DLAs requirements to set up a trust so that they could gain
access to the land, with the understanding that Inkosi Hadebe
and tribal structures would continue to administer the land
once it was transferred to the trust. During legal entity
workshops, the community decided that Inkosi Hadebe should
be an ex-officio member of the trust since he needed to stand
above ordinary elected trustees. A provision in the trust deed
thus refers to trustees making decisions in consultation with
the Inkosi. In addition, a certain number of trustees had to be
members of the tribal council.
Despite the communitys opportunistic decision to conform to
government requirements to set up a trust, and attempts to
integrate the tribal authority with the legal entity, there are
serious power struggles in the trust. These manifest themselves
around definitions of membership, access to grazing and arable
land, development visions and management of the new land.
According to those trustees and community members who
subscribe to tribal practices, all members of the AmaHlubi have
access to the new land and its natural resources, the indunas
and councillors continue to have allocatory functions and the
tribal court resolves disputes. According to the chairman of the
trust and those community members who are seeking to
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transform the area along modern development lines, only those
people who are grant beneficiaries have access to the new land
and the trust has allocatory and dispute resolution functions.
When asked about the role of the tribal authority in the trust,
the chairman says the trust is obliged to inform the Inkosi about
its decisions. This, he says, is what in consultation with means.
It is not clear yet how these fissures will be resolved in
practice. What is clear though is that failure to resolve them will
result either in paralysis of the trust or in members of the
community attempting to access resources through
opportunistic use of the dual institutions. Although it is too
early to predict what this may mean for tenure security, some
scenarios can be forecast, namely, that a hybrid institution will
develop, or that either the trust or the tribal authority will gain
dominance and extinguish the other, or that things will be
immobilised. While the legal implications of this are uncertain,
what is certain is that this process will occur with little recourse
to government support and institutions.
Thembalihle
The AmaHlubi are living with and managing tensions between
dual institutions, although the long-term outcomes of this
tension are still unknown. The Thembalihle community,
however, was caught up in a violent war of tribal jurisdiction
that has resulted in deaths and displacement of people. An NGO
facilitated the processes of setting up a trust in Thembalihle
that involved widespread participation and consultation of
community members, with an emphasis on the involvement of
the youth and women. Issues of tribal allegiance or jurisdiction
were either not raised at the time or were not seen to be
important. It was only once the trust took transfer of the land
that two amakhosi laid claim to the land and the war over who
had jurisdiction ensued. Attempts by various government
departments and NGOs to mediate the conflict were
unsuccessful. The failure of this land reform project did,
however, serve to underline that the amakhosi, their
jurisdiction and their control over land could not be disregarded
in land reform projects. Despite this, legal and policy
frameworks give no guidance on how to work with tribal and
traditional authorities, and official practices still tend to ignore
them in the setting up of common property institutions.
Nkaseni
At Nkaseni, for instance, the constitution has no references to
customary practices and yet the community clearly understand
property boundaries in a traditional or customary sense and not
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as is defined by the cadastral system. Thus, relationships with
people living on neighbouring privately owned farms are close-
knit and the neighbours appear to have insider status, if not
actual rights to the land and resources. Furthermore,
community is understood as inclusive of those people living on
neighbouring land, and an ibandla9 makes decisions affecting
the community, not the trustees.
It is not clear why the attempts to develop hybrid institutions
in some communities appear to be relatively conflict free, at
least at a local level. It might be due to a strong district
leadership that has spearheaded the engagement with DLAs
land reform programme and that understands and respects the
role and involvement of the tribal authorities in the area. What
is clear about the hybridisation is that these local CPIs are
closely linked to wider institutions in the district, which play a
central role in their functioning. But it bears repeating that
these linkages are not as a result of land reform law, policy or
practice.
While the jurisdiction and involvement of tribal authorities is
present in many rural peoples lives in KwaZulu-Natal, there are
areas where it is absent. Members of the Gannahoek
community were labour tenants who took transfer from the
farmer of the land they had lived on for generations. Leadership
in the community is spread across a number of elderly men,
who are also mostly trustees. Although the chairperson of the
trust is referred to as an induna, this is more in the sense of
responsibility, authority and leadership than an allusion to a
tribal link. Nobody in the community knew who the Inkosi with
jurisdiction over the land was, and there was clear consensus
that the tribal authority has no role to play in the affairs of the
community.
6.2 Coherent legal and institutional frameworks: with eyes on
government
Government has a constitutional obligation to provide secure
tenure to all South Africans. The key legal and technical
mechanism it has used to do this is ownership through a title
deed. The Act gives rights to members of groups through
contractual agreement with the CPA, which owns the property
in freehold. Recognising the essential negotiability of rights to
land and resources in CPIs and the possibility of abuse opened
up by this negotiability, the Act provides for a monitoring and
interventionist role for the DLA in CPAs.
This section looks briefly at why DLA doesnt perform this role
and some of the implications of its inaction. We then consider
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some alternatives to contractual rights and some of the
institutional and technical issues involved in these alternatives.
The Deeds Office, Surveyor Generals Office and the private
sector professions of conveyancing and surveying underpin
freehold tenure in SA. The legal provision for the institutional
support of members of common property arrangements is in the
CPA Act and trust legislation that provides for fiduciary
monitoring by the Master of the High Court.10 The freehold
transfer of property to CPIs theoretically ensures that the
groups tenure is secured against arbitrary appropriation by the
state and others.11 Members of CPAs who have been treated
arbitrarily by the group have legal recourse to the DLA.
These legal provisions for DLAs institutional support of
members of CPIs are not realised in practice because the
monitoring functions provided for by the law have simply not
been undertaken. Some provincial officials have said that land
reform projects are coming back to us for help12 with land
invasions, eviction of members and disputes around land and
resource allocations. However, they have said that they cannot
intervene in CPIs because there is no basis for this intervention.
They argue that problems with beneficiary lists and the absence
of spatial records of member holdings and rights means that
there is no information base from which to make an intervention
(Hornby 2000). In addition to this, they argue that they do not
have the capacity to monitor CPAs.13
Further, Regional Councils tasked to provide services with the
remainder of the grants have approached DLA to clarify who the
rights holders are in order that they know who to consult with.
Although there is no official position on how to deal with these
issues, some officials have said in informal discussions that we
have decided not to deal with these cases unless there is a
development imperative.14
It is odd indeed that officials can choose to disregard the law.
We would suggest that this is because political priorities are to
transfer land and to spend budgets, and not the maintenance of
tenure security. Broader institutional arrangements for the
provision of tenure security have in effect never developed
beyond the provision of freehold tenure. This raises serious
questions about the contractual underpinning of membership
rights in common property institutions, because contracts are
only as good as the capacity of parties to enforce them.
Contractual rights become meaningless where that capacity is
eroded because of internal conflict or tribal contestation, if there
is no neutral institutional support for individuals and groups to
assert their rights.
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The judicial system could be viewed as an alternative
recourse. However, this makes a strong presumption that legal
options would be pursued and that the findings of any court
would be upheld locally. Moreover, any legal intervention would
draw on relevant legislation and community constitutions and
the findings are likely to prejudice the rights of many people,
because of flawed documents that also do not reflect local
practice. This leads to the conclusion that formal law remains an
unrealistic arbiter of disputes for most rural people, because it
is not sufficiently embedded in the real institutions and
practices that frame their lives.
6.3 A new tune to dance to  the legislative shuffle
The problem of how to grant real rights in land to members of
groups, in conformity with constitutional requirements and
without damaging the essential negotiability and adaptability of
common property arrangements, was a key concern of the
drafters of the Land Rights Bill. The problem was resolved
through these provisions:
· Individual users of land would be granted statutory
ownership rights while nominal title remained in the name
of the state or legal entity.
· Members would choose their institutions for land
management.
· The state would provide decentralised institutions to monitor
local land management institutions and to mediate and
arbitrate on individual versus group disputes.
In addition to these provisions, statutory rights holders would be
able to register their rights in terms of the Registration
Facilitation Bill. Although this Bill does not appear to provide for
affordable and accessible registration procedures, it does
nevertheless provide a mechanism for people living within
group-administered systems to obtain individual records of their
land holdings.
Drafters of the Land Rights and Registration Facilitation Bills
thus recognised the importance of legal, institutional and
technical coherence in provision of tenure security. However,
the DLA minister shelved the Land Rights Bill last year saying it
was inappropriate and too expensive to implement. One can
only guess at the political priorities that informed these
statements. The publicised alternative proposal to the Land
Rights Bill is to transfer land to traditional communities using
the Upgrading of Land Tenure Act (ULTRA 1993) despite
evidence that the Act results in members of groups losing rights,
and that transfer of land to traditional communities is likely to
create conflict. Furthermore, the legal nature of individual
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informal rights to land and resources and institutional support
for the assertion, claiming and realising of these rights are not
addressed in ULTRA. It is rumoured that a Land Administration
Bill is being drafted but it is not yet known whether it provides
mechanisms and institutions for individuals to secure their
rights in common property situations.
7. Closing the gap
This analysis reflects the disjuncture betweenthe intentions of the law and the daily realityof people living their lives. This disjuncturecreates fissures in and between land management
institutions and between constitutional provisions and practice
on the ground, which then generates a dangerous
indeterminacy. At worst it has created competing and conflicting
local institutions that lay claim to different memberships, with
sometimes devastating effect on peoples lives and tenure
security.  The fractured way in which membership definition is
dealt with increases the risks and insecurity for vulnerable
household members. Furthermore, the state has not only failed
to recognise the existence and effects of this indeterminacy, but
continues to express political priorities that undermine the
tenure security of individuals living in group systems.
We have argued that the indeterminacy can be minimised
through serious attempts to achieve legal, institutional and
technical coherence that recognises local practices and builds
bridges to formal law and institutions.
Communities constitute their membership in more or less
customary ways, by means more or less in the control of the
group or its authority. At the point of interacting with a land
reform programme, membership comes to have some specific
meanings and implications. These may have more or less
(usually less) to do with the previous or existing practices,
familiar and legitimate to the people concerned. This suggests
that land reform grants should not be regarded as though they
confer rights on those whose names are used to access them.
There is a need to unburden the CPIs of unrealistic
expectations by focusing on tenure security of the group and its
members. Our findings also suggest that as long as there are
prescriptions on what the constitution must contain, the mere
form of the document will prevail. LEAPs indicators suggest we
should be developing constitutions with communities, which are
meaningful and effective for the particular group now, but which
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enable adaptation towards greater equity for women,
transparency, etc. Field processes should be designed to start
with How do we do things now? with regards to entry and exit,
and land allocation and transfer. This content should be
recorded to facilitate community access and use, and be
protected from the obfuscations of conventional legal forms. The
political choice would need to be one of acceptance of the status
quo while instituting processes (such as at constitution drafting)
to hold real discussion and move towards constitutional
principles. The institutional linkages then become the key to
supporting tenure rights as they are, and in gradual adaptation
towards greater equity.
Experience demonstrates that where there is a strong tribal
presence, it is a mistake to ignore or disregard the impact of
customary systems on the functioning of the common property
institutions. Government has an imperative to negotiate the role
and involvement of the tribal authority in CPIs, because failure
to do so results in conflicting allocatory and adjudicatory
systems. In this, as in all CPI establishment, it is important that
the ownership should vest in the members and attention be
focused on clarifying and adapting community processes for
asserting, justifying and realising rights.
  There is clearly no coherent legal and institutional
framework that is accessible to people. The Land Rights Bill
sought to provide this, and it, or something like it, is crucial to
secure the tenure of individuals living in CPIs. Linked to this
there is a need to develop systems for the production,
maintenance and updating of land records situated within the
institutional framework. Together these should provide concrete
support to members of CPIs to assert and justify their rights,
and to CPIs to adjudicate and enforce these rights.
While it is recognised that legal, institutional and technical
coherence is difficult to achieve, there has been little evidence
over the past year or so to suggest that the DLA considers this
an important political imperative. Failure to give this issue
proper prioritisation is not only unconstitutional, it is also
tantamount to denying the poor true citizenship of the country
based on secure tenure and access to developmental resources.
Endnotes
1. The current conflict around local government boundaries
and elections demonstrates this unresolved nature of the
roles of elected and traditional authorities.
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2. Constitutions and trust deeds, field reports and constitution
simplifications and assessments referred to are included in
the bibliography, and thus are not referenced here.
3. Personal communication Hlongwa M, September 2000.
4. An isigodi is a tribal ward that falls under the authority of a
single induna.
5. The community says a committee has been elected, but the
DLA official was not present at the election.
6. Inkosi is translated as chief.
7. Tribal membership fee.
8. A group of neighbours who witness demarcation. It can be a
group of elders in other communities.
9. Unfortunately, the constitution or history of the ibandla is
not described in the case-study.
10. The Master of the High Court in Pietermaritzburg has said
he does not do this for community land trusts (LEAP 2000).
11. We say theoretically because recent stories suggest that
CPIs are not able to manage invasions of their property. The
key reason for this appears to be the regulation of evictions
under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act that entails
an expensive court process and the provision of alternative
land.
12. Informal discussion with Lisa del Grande; Hornby D 2000.
13. Informal discussions with officials; Hornby D 1996 and
2000.
14. This is particularly the case with large settlements where
beneficiaries and others have settled under customary
allocation systems and not according to business plans.
Information from informal discussion with Lisa del Grande;
Hornby D 2000.
8. References
Bruce, J et al. 1994. The findings and their policy implications:
institutional adaptation or replacement, in Searching for
land tenure security in Africa, edited by J Bruce and S
Migot-Adholla. Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company.
Cousins, T. 1996. Women, risk and tenure security: seeking
gender equity in land reform in South Africa. Masters
dissertation, University of London.
Department of Land Affairs. 1996. Communal Property
Associations Act.
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 28
Leaping the fissures
Tessa Cousins and Donna Hornby
Department of Land Affairs. 1997. White paper on South African
land reform policy.
Hargreaves, S & Meer, S. 1999. Out of the margins and into the
centre: Gender and institutional change, in At the
crossroads. Cape Town: PLAAS.
Hornby, D. 1996. An analysis of the constraints on a micro-
institution in the KwaZulu-Natal Land Reform Pilot
Programme. Masters thesis, University of Natal, Durban.
Klug, H. Constituting community: Universalism and communal
governance in the recreation of rural communities in South
Africa. Unpublished.
LEAP. 1999. Legal entities in land reform, lessons for policy and
practice. Paper presented at the Land and agrarian reform
conference, PLAAS/NLC, Johannesburg, July 2628.
LEAP. 2000. Towards communal property associations that work
in the context of land reform. Paper presented at the
Security of tenure and sustainable livelihoods in Communal
Property Associations conference, CALS, Johannesburg,
May 45.
Lavigne Delville, P. 2000. Harmonising formal law and
customary land rights in French speaking West Africa, in
Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa, edited by C
Toulmin and J Quan. London: DFID/IIED/NRI.
McAuslan, P. 2000. Only the name of the country changes: The
diaspora of European land law in Commonwealth Africa, in
Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa, edited by C
Toulmin and J Quan. London: DFID/IIED/NRI.
Moore, S. 1978. Law as process: An anthropological approach.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Toulmin, C & Quan, JF (eds). 2000. Evolving land rights, policy
and tenure in Africa. London: DFID/IIED/NRI.
PILAR workshop reports
Hornby, D. 2000. Stakeholder workshop minutes on land
recording systems. Workshop report.  Pietermaritzburg:
AFRA.
Hornby, D. 2000. Piloting locally administered land recording
systems. Workshop report. Pietermartizburg: AFRA.
Hornby, D. 2000. Piloting individual ownership documents.
Workshop report. Pietermartizburg: AFRA.
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 29
No.      Occasional Paper Series19
LEAP documents/field reports
Case-study 1: Nkaseni. 1999. LEAP. T Trench, H Dube, D Zungu
and N Sokhela.
Case-study 2: Gannahoek. 1999. LEAP. T Trench, S Ngceshu
and H Dube.
Case-study of Dithakwaneng Community. 1999. LEAP; ANCRA.
(Prepared for a LEAP workshop.)
Report on Bedrog Legal Entity assessment fieldwork. 1999. N
Mqadi, N Ziqubu and J Ngobese.
Report on Bellevue 600 LEAP fieldwork. 1999. N Mqadi, N
Ziqubu and J Ngobese.
Report on the research conducted on the Emsi Lonsdale Legal
Entity. 1999. M Hlongwa, N Sokhele, S Gumede and M
Masondo.
Report on the research conducted on the Vukile/Impala Legal
Entity. 1999. M Hlongwa, N Sokhele, S Gumede and M
Masondo.
Research report for Whitecliff in Muden. 1999. M Hlongwa, N
Sokhele and M Masondo.
Constitutions and trust deeds
EMSI Community Land Trust, 1996.
Gannahoek Farm Trust, 1994.
Intuthuko Community Land Trust, 1998. (Bellevue in the field
report)
Nkaseni Estate Community Land Trust, 1997, registered as
Nkaseni Communal Property Association (a similar entity)
in 1999.
Ntabenzima Trust, 1996. (Whitecliff in the field report)
Uzulu Angafana Ukusuka Community Property Association,
1998. (Bedrog 600 in the field report)
Vukile/Impala Community Land Trust, 1996.
Analyses of constitutions
EMSI Community Land Trust Deed simplification. June 2000. T
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Gannahoek Farm Trust Deed assessment. July 2000. T Trench.
Intuthuko Community Land Trust assessment. July 2000. T
Trench.
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Ntabenzima Trust assessment. June 2000. P Loynes.
Simplification of Vukile/Impala Community Land Trust Deed.
July 2000. T Trench.
Uzulu Angafana Ukusuka CPA assessment. June 2000. P
Loynes.
